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2 CHISELS OR SCREWDRIVERS? 
A CRITIQUE OF THE NERA PROPOSALS 
FOR THE REFORM OF THE NHS 
by Professor A I Culyer 
Introduction 
The report, Financing Health Care, prepared by 
National Economic Research Associates, (NERA) 
runs to two volumes and 1453 pages, reviews the 
experience of 12 countries, develops a Prototype 
model and a phased strategy by which the UK 
might approach it, and has plainly involved a huge 
amount of work to which I can scarcely do justice 
in the space available. I thus have a problem akin 
to that of the authors of the report: given the vast 
complexity of the systems — indeed of our own —
and the immense range of issues that any 
proposals for change must range over, how can one 
fasten on to the key issues without grossly over-
simplifying and doing gross injustice to the 
authors? The problem faced by the authors — which 
I may as well say that I do not think they have 
altogether resolved — is that, in comparing 
international systems, while it is undoubtedly true 
that some aspirations and problems are shared in 
common, history and culture never are, and neither 
are all of the aspirations and problems. It is not so 
hard (though it is not easy) to compare the 
workings of one system with either some 
aspirations of one's own or those of another system 
and find it wanting — but that is not a lot of help if 
the shortcomings thus identified are being judged 
by a set of criteria which are not those of the clients 
of the system being evaluated. 
I propose to divide my discussion into the 
following parts: 
• first I shall review the Report's diagnosis of the 
problems faced by the NHS; 
• second, I shall review their proposed treatment; 
• thirdly, I shall then ask whether the diagnosis is 
correct and the treatment appropriate and cost-
effective; 
• finally, I shall briefly enquire into other possible 
diagnoses and alternative treatments for the 
patient. 
I shall not review the descriptions and analyses of 
the health care systems of other countries but shall 
focus on the UK, making occasional reference to 
other countries where it may be helpful. I shall not 
comment on the study's discussion of the 
implications of its recommendations for the 
pharmaceutical industry, though I may as well say, 
less there by any doubt about it, that a profitable, 
thriving and innovative pharmaceutical industry is 
something to cherish and, although I do not think 
that the welfare of the industry is something that 
should drive the financial and organisational 
structure of health services, I am confident that the 
industry is well capable of responding effectively, 
appropriately — and profitably — to most systems 
likely to evolve in western society that are this side 
of rational. 
The diagnosis 
There is no single place in the study at which the 
reader can find a convenient summary of the 
problems faced and so there is some risk that I may 
have missed some crucial element in the diagnosis, 
However, a trawl reveals the following: 
• government is predicted to relinquish the roles 
of health insurer and health care provider to the 
market, which forces the issue of change and 
reform dramatically (p3); 
• the demand for health care will continue to 
outstrip the supply due to aging population 
and technical advance (p3); 
• bureaucracies are inherently less responsive to 
demands for new treatments than market 
orientated systems (p22); 
• governments will choose to spend less on 
health care than individuals prefer (p3); 
• centralised systems, such as the NHS, create 
distortions which seriously compromise the 
delivery of appropriate levels of service (p5); 
• patients and physicians do not have the correct 
incentives or information for making well-
informed and efficient choices (p6). 
The treatment 
The recommended treatment is 'required to move 
the existing UK system towards that of the NERA 
Prototype over the long term' (p1127). The main 
components are: 
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• establish an agreed Guaranteed Health Care 
Package (GHCP) (the initial contents of this are 
said to be the current range of NHS services, 
whatever this is (p1132), but the 'target' contents 
of the GHCP in the Prototype are not given, so 
it is not clear whether the services included 
would curtail or extend the current range of 
NHS and community care benefits) (p1127); 
• introduce a market for health care insurance for 
the GHCP (plus top-ups at customer discretion) 
with insurers being denied the right to turn 
away clients for the GHCP at prevailing 
premiums (p1127-8); 
• make health insurance compulsory (p1128); 
• set premiums in two parts: one, a function of 
(family?) income payable to a central agency, for 
redistribution to insurers after adjustment for 
risk: the other payable directly to insurers and 
risk-rated (p1129); 
• establish a public National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHF) for those 'unable to manage their 
own health care insurance' (p1130); 
• all 'Services within the GHCP to be subject to 
mandatory co-payments (initially with 
exemptions but 'increasing the rigour over 
time') (p1133); 
• by implication, abolish the NHSE, its regional 
offices, FHSAs, DHAs and GP fundholders (it is 
not clear what implications there are for services 
provided outside general practice or hospitals, 
such as community services, blood transfusion 
services or ambulance services); 
• make contracts between insurers (purchasers) 
and providers (public or private, primary, 
secondary and tertiary care) legally binding and 
enforceable at law (p1131); 
• deny insurers (purchasers) the right to own 
providing institutions (p1131); 
• create unregulated entry for providers (subject 
to 'medical qualification requirements') and 
permit providers full access to the capital 
market (p1131); 
• reduce the role of government to accrediting 
insurer, enforcing compulsion in insurance and 
the way the insurance market works, collecting 
premiums for the central fund and specifying 
the GHCP. 
Is the diagnosis correct? 
What are the objectives? 
In asking whether the diagnosis is right, one comes 
directly up against an issue to which I alluded at 
the beginning: what are we trying to achieve? It is 
quite clearly one central objective of the current 
NHS to increase the scope and range of individual 
(patient) choice. I shall return to this later. Another, 
on which I shall for the present concentrate, is to 
maximise 'health gain'. What this means is not 
entirely clear and neither 'health' nor 'gain' 
(presumably some positive difference attributable 
to the use compared with the non-use of health 
services) are easy either to conceptualise or 
quantify. However, these difficulties are hardly 
grounds for ignoring or replacing this objective 
with some other. Indeed, if I were going to write a 
report on the current problems of the NHS I would 
actually begin with an analysis of the efficiency 
issue of what it ought to be maximising (and what 
limits its success in accomplishing that objective) 
and then complement that by a parallel analysis of 
the currently unpopular theme of equity in resource 
distribution (and what limits success in 
accomplishing that). I think I might be able to 
make a good case for maximising health gain (and 
justify this broad objective as superior to a 
consumer sovereignty model), and be able to put 
some practical content into both 'health' and 'gain' 
(with perhaps some epidemiological help) to guide 
both purchasers and providers, and I think also 
that I might be able to develop both some 
principles to guide distributional judgements and 
some practical suggestions for improvements on 
where we are now. I do not think the implications 
of this for organisational and financial structures 
would be terribly radical — but, then, I take the 
view that the structures currently being developed 
(which may be characterised as 'demand-side 
socialism') are broadly right with the main things 
needed being a loosening of the capital market, 
some mechanism for freeing management from 
political interference, and a need for equity to take 
a more central role as an allocation criterion — plus 
one other thing (where I come into closer tangency 
with the authors of our report) — the need to create 
a mechanism through which genuine desires by the 
purchasing/voting public for greater expenditure 
on health care can be reflected in the actual 
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resource flow to the NHS, thus escaping an 
implacable Treasury public expenditure constraint 
imposed on grounds of so-called macro efficiency 
but at the cost of probable micro inefficiency. But 
this is not my report. I make these comments 
simply to remind you of the old truth that where 
you stand (on health care reform) depends on 
where you sit (your ideological and financial 
interests) and where you sit is essentially a matter 
of the objectives you either accept from someone 
else or put up for your little old self. 
So what are the underlying objectives for the health 
care system of the UK as seen by our authors? 
They are elusive. And who are the ultimate clients 
for the study and what are their objectives? Are 
their objectives likely to be shared by the British 
electorate? Even if we pick the diagnosis apart, 
these issues do not become any clearer. But let us 
look anyway at the diagnosis in more detail. 
The diagnosis in detail 
(i) A reduced role for Government 
I do not intend to give any weight to the first of 
their diagnostic bullet points because, as a 
prediction, I see no basis for it other than as wish 
fulfilment. The issue as I see it is whether the 
government ought to relinquish or take on roles, 
not that this is something to be taken for granted 
with the implication that we then have to cast 
around to make the best out of whatever fate 
thrusts upon us. 
(ii) Demand for health care will outstrip supply 
The second bullet point is more substantive. But it 
is hardly news. What it is saying is that health care 
has to be rationed. I don't think anyone denies that 
(apart from the occasional minister who wants to 
avoid an awkward public debate). The issues are, 
of course, the levels to which demand (or need) is to 
be rationed, the criteria that are to be used in the 
rationing and the means used to do the rationing. 
But let me enter a dissenting note of caution on 
those alleged twin drivers of the overall medical 
bill, to which the authors draw our attention: an 
aging in population and changing technology. I 
find it distressing that our authors, along with a 
good deal of distinguished company, treat these 
two factors as exogenous when it seems to me plain 
that they are in very large part endogenous — that is, 
determined within the overall economic system. If 
health care expenditure per head of elderly is rising 
relative to health care spending per head of the 
rest, then that- is the result of decisions taken within 
the system — and decisions, moreover, that are 
frequently alleged, by people in a position to know, 
to be inappropriate. Chucking high-tech medicines 
and inpatient care at the elderly regardless of true 
cost-effectiveness is not something that we have to 
do. Nor do we have to adopt every latest mark of 
imaging technology the moment it appears 
(indeed, the authors themselves make quite clear 
that different systems manage to control the 
introduction of new technologies at quite different 
rates). Incidentally, are such technologies to be in 
or out of the GHCP? You could argue either way —
or for a sophisticated mix. But to determine which 
one needs a clearer statement of the objectives of 
the system. 
Moreover, I conjecture that the character of the 
research that produces the sorts of technology that 
are held to drive costs ever upwards (relative to 
constant price GDP) is itself endogenous — it itself is 
driven by knowledge of what it is that the finance 
of medical care will pay for, so even the research 
(and especially the industrial research in 
companies and the research sponsored by them in 
universities and elsewhere) is ultimately 
endogenous and therefore influenced by system 
design. Of course, some technological change is 
cost-reducing rather than cost-increasing. The 
development of an effective vaccine for Polio is a 
classic example that eliminated the need for the 
iron lung; or that for rubella, which led to a greatly 
reduced incidence of babies with birth defects. But, 
in general, technological advance in medicine tends 
to be cost-increasing. A notable example is modern 
neo-natal intensive care which has increased the 
survival chances greatly of low and very low 
birthweight babies but which has major cost 
consequences not only of the neonatal care itself 
but also of the subsequent long term care of these 
children as they survive into adulthood. I 
conjecture that this 'bias' towards cost-increasing 
technological change is not accidental. None of 
these things is inexorable. They are themselves 
generated by the systems we have and the 
incentives they embody. No successful business is 
going to embark on the development of products if 
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it believes there is no market for them - and 
whether or not there is such a market depends on 
the willingness and ability to pay of those with 
power to decide what technologies they shall use, 
and the criteria to be used in selecting new - or 
come to that, old - technologies. These ultimate 
determinants of the pattern of technological 
research and development are all endogenous and 
therefore a function of system design. 
(iii) Bureaucracy is less responsive to new 
technology 
It is not very good analysis simply to say that 
'bureaucracies are inherently less responsive to 
demands for new treatments than are market-
orientated systems' (p22). Market orientated 
systems of competing funders have immense 
bureaucracies of their own which respond, as do all 
bureaucracies, to the organisational goals that are 
set for them and the rewards systems in operation 
to promote those goals. It may be that public 
bureaucracies are less efficient than private ones -
but we have to ask (again): efficient at what? If a 
public 'bureaucracy' like a purchasing health 
authority has more rigorous standards of 
effectiveness than a private health insurance 
agency, then the difference between purchasing 
decisions will reflect something quite different 
from 'inherent'lack of responsiveness. After all, 
there is abundant evidence that competition 
between health care providers in the US operates 
less through price than through what is, somewhat 
misleading, often called 'quality', and this is why 
you will find under-utilised (and probably mis-
used) CAT scanners in neighbouring 50-bed 
hospitals in the US. Is this the sort of 
'responsiveness' which our authors want to see in 
the UK? Perhaps it is. But if it is not, I have to 
wonder at the (bureaucratic) mechanisms that 
competitive insurers might employ to counter the 
very real inherent tendencies that such competition 
is likely to evoke, especially since it seems 
inevitable that they will seek to fund 'managed 
care' on the provision side of health care. 
Beneath all this there is, however, a fundamental 
and real difficulty. It can be put quite simply as a 
question: what is the optimum rate of diffusion of a 
new technology? It is not adequate to reply; 'let the 
market decide' because, first, the market is 
extremely imperfect and, second, the element of 
public accountability for expenditures is going to 
be high even under the prototype. In essence the 
problem involves a trade-off between two 
uncertain elements: the postponement of possible 
(but uncertain) benefits while effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness trials and analyses are done, 
against the greater assurance that what is adopted 
will have real benefit and constitute value for 
money. These issues are currently being examined 
in the Health Technology Assessment programme 
of the NHS Executive and I do not pretend to 
know what the right general answer is - except 
that it is unlikely to be 'leave it to the market'! To 
whom will our authors leave it? 
(iv) Macro and micro efficiency 
I conjecture that the nub of our authors' diagnosis 
lies in the last three bullet points. They are telling 
us that too little is spent on the NHS (macro 
inefficiency) and that what is spent is not spent 
efficiently (micro inefficiency). Now, efficiency is, 
of itself, a pretty emotionless term. It means simply 
maximising outcome per unit of input. The big 
issue here is evidently what should we be 
maximising? I think what our authors have in mind 
is good old-fashioned welfarism - we should be 
maximising individual welfares, as perceived by 
individual clients. Put more crudely, health is like 
most other things, so let individuals choose subject 
to the prices they confront and their incomes. It 
must be said, less I be thought unfair, that it is not 
all that clear that this really is what is in their 
minds, particularly when one reads their 
discussion of performance (p13-15). They tell us 
(p13) that "'Health care expenditure (HCE) as a 
percentage of GDP', and 'HCE per capita' are 
measures for macroeconomic efficiency of health 
care systems' but they also tell us (p29) that 'the 
amount... of health care services should reflect the 
informed preference of consumers'. Now, as a 
matter of fact (or, rather, of definition) HCE as a 
percentage of anything or per head of population 
tells us nothing at all (even as a proxy) about 
efficiency of any kind, nor would a monetary 
estimate of benefit as a percentage of something or 
per head. 'Macroeconomic efficiency', if it means 
anything, must mean that the total spend is such as 
to optimise the social benefit relative to the social 
cost. The fact, as reported by our authors (p13), 
that HCE as a percentage of GDP has been rising in 
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the United States cannot credibly be held to imply 
that the macroeconomic efficiency of US health care 
has been rising. Or should we take it that our 
authors want us to interpret the trend as evidence 
for a falling macroeconomic efficiency in the US? 
The ambiguity is plain. Likewise, the fact that the 
UK spends less on health care as a percentage of 
GDP or per head than many other developed 
countries, does not imply anything about efficiency 
unless one assumes that by some magic everyone 
else has their shares at the optimal level and the 
criteria for determining cost and benefit are 
appropriately the same across comparator 
countries. 
Our authors' index of microeconomic efficiency is 
physician visits per head. This index is neither a 
cost nor a benefit indicator, but a measure of 
utilisation or, if turned upside down, a workload 
measure for physicians. So this, in international 
comparisons, is not going to reveal any relative 
efficiency or inefficiency in the NHS to other 
countries. Nor does it have any clear bearing on 
the issue of whether these quantities 'reflect the 
informed preference of consumers'. 
Back to the objective of 'efficiency' 
Economics has only one concept of efficiency, not a 
micro one and a macro one, and central to this 
concept is the idea of maximising some value 
function, such as utility, welfare or health gain, 
subject to constraints. Depending on the scope of 
the analysis, the constraint might be taken as the 
resources available to the NHS (where the system 
is judged efficient if it maximises the postulated 
value function given these resources) or, at a 
broader level, the resources of the whole 
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community (where the health care system is judged 
efficient if it allocates an optimal share to health 
care and maximises the value function given the 
share allocated to it). 
The idea is at once so important and easy to lose 
sight of when one comes to try to apply it, that it is 
worth spending just a little time getting the theory 
straight. I hope you will forgive me for an 
economist's diagram that I use to illustrate 
efficiency in the context of a given 'budget' for 
health care. In Figure 5 I have assumed, for 
simplicity, that there are just two people (A and B) 
and that there is a fixed sum annually available for 
spending on health care. This budget is shown in 
quadrant III of the diagram as sum of money, 
which could all be spent on A (in which case A 
gets XAmax) or on B (Xgraax )• Or, of course, it could 
be divided between them at any point on the 
straight line connecting these two points, which is 
called the budget constraint. The outcome of 
applying health care resources to A or B depends 
upon what economists call the production function. 
A production function shows the maximum rates of 
outcome that can be obtained at various levels of 
use of the inputs, assuming that at any level of 
opportunity cost, the mix of inputs (bed days, 
physician time, use of equipment, etc.) is optimised 
to maximise expected outcome. These functions 
identify what the authors quite correctly call (p150) 
'productive efficiency'. I have supposed that the 
production functions exhibit diminishing returns 
so that, for constant increases in resource 
commitment under prevailing technology, 
additional health outcome becomes smaller and 
smaller. Production functions for A and B are 
shown in quadrants II and IV, where I have 
assumed that B is relatively sick and also has a 
greater capacity to benefit from health care over a 
wide range of expenditures. 
I have also assumed that 'health' is the relevant 
outcome desired and that we have an acceptable 
measure of it. Each production function has its 
origin at the relevant individual's current health 
status or some appropriately weighted (and 
discounted) sum of future expected health without 
a health care intervention, and the outcome is the 
expected change in (the present value of) health that 
results from the application of health care 
resources. The co-ordinates of point S in quadrant 
I, the 'starting point', indicate the presenting states 
of health of the two individuals. 
If we were to trace round the maximum health gain 
for A and B for different divisions of the budget in 
quadrant II between them, one would trace out the 
convex locus in quadrant I which is called the 
health frontier. This shows the maximum increases 
in health that are possible, given the budget in 
quadrant III, the presenting states, and the two 
production functions determined by prevailing 
technology in quadrants II and IV. 
In the sense of production efficiency, any point on 
the health frontier is an efficient point. It follows that a 
system is inefficient if, for any reason, the 
allocation of resources between individuals (in 
quadrant III) results in a point in quadrant I that 
lies inside the health frontier. This is most likely to 
arise because the most efficient production 
technology is not being used so that, given any 
amount of resources devoted to, say, A, the health 
gain is less than that indicated by the production 
function in quadrant II. In common parlance, such 
treatments would be seen either as inappropriate, 
inefficacious, ineffective, or not cost-effective. A 
failure in any one of these respects for either 
individual will result in an outcome that lies below 
the health frontier in quadrant I. In my opinion, 
this source of inefficiency is the most prevalent in 
all systems of health care including the NHS (the 
epidemiology literature is replete with examples of 
wide and inexplicable variations in clinical 
practice, continued use of proven ineffective 
procedures, and the use — this is the largest 
category — of procedures that have never been 
subject to careful critical scrutiny, let alone tested 
for cost-effectiveness). A concern for this aspect of 
efficiency lies at the heart of the government's 
drive for a 'knowledge-based' health service and 
which is also driving its research and development 
programme, the meta-analytic function of the UK 
Cochrane Centre, and the no less important 
activities of disseminating best practice (the York 
Centre for Reviews and Dissemination) and trying 
to secure a contracting and incentive environment 
that maximises take-up of cost-effective methods of 
health care, which mainly means educating 
purchasers so that they can better identify true 
needs, and not just current mortality and 
morbidity, and then purchase truly effective 
services to meet these needs. 
There is a big value judgement in the foregoing, 
which is that I have chosen a particular outcome 
concept — health. However, I am hopeful that the 
analysis so far can be tied in quite closely to our 
authors' analysis because they too place 
considerable emphasis on health status (proxied 
negatively by potential life years lost and perinatal 
mortality) as an objective for systems and as a 
measure of performance. 
Some economists would push the idea of efficiency 
further — beyond that of productive efficiency — so as 
to embrace the idea of exchange efficiency — an 
efficient allocation of outcome across individuals. In 
the market system, individuals ('consumers' in the 
language of our authors) would form a judgement 
of the value of additional health to them and 
express this in terms of the purchase of appropriate 
inputs, given their income and wealth, insurance 
status, and so on. The relative marginal valuations 
of health implied in such a system can be indicated 
by the prices individuals would be willing to pay 
for additional health and these relative prices are 
shown by the slope of line such as the one I have 
labelled PP in quadrant I. If these were indeed the 
implied relative marginal valuations of health in 
our community of two people, then E on the health 
frontier is the allocative efficiency point and this, as 
you may readily see, would entail a distribution of 
the health budget between A and B shown by point 
X on the budget line on quadrant III. (I have used 
the 'implied' just now because markets will not, of 
course, directly reveal the marginal values put 
upon health, but those put upon health care. The 
'shadow price' of health can, however, be inferred 
from these, given the production functions.) 
However, I do not myself much like this way of 
extending the idea of efficiency, because I think the 
sort of principle that ought to guide interpersonal 
allocation ought to be much more guided by 
judgements of fairness or equity. I would prefer to 
see the idea of efficiency in health care as being to 
do with the supply side, and this seems to me to be 
the way the government also sees the matter. I 
personally tend to prefer points closer to e on the 
health frontier in quadrant I, which, since it lies on 
the 45° line through the origin in quadrant I, 
indicates (complete) equality of health between A 
and B. Less strongly, I prefer points on the frontier 
closer to the 45° line than the starting point S is. 
Note, incidentally, that aiming at greater equality 
of health will generally involve an unequal 
allocation of resources between individuals (tracing 
back from point e to the budget line does not bring 
you to the half-way point along it, XA is not equal 
to X B ). Note also that going for equal health is not 
the same as going for equal health gain — which 
would involve preferring a point as close as 
possible to where a 45° line passing through S cuts 
the health frontier. 
Now it is not my purpose to become bogged down 
in theoretical niceties, but the analysis we have just 
done does enable us to make some quite important 
distinctions (for example, about efficiency in 
production compared to efficiency in interpersonal 
allocation, or that going for a more equal 
distribution of health in the community may 
involve quite unequal allocation of health care 
resources within the community, or that the final 
distribution of health in the community depends 
upon presenting health states — and the non-health 
care determinants of these, the relevant production 
functions, and the distribution of health care 
expenditures) and it also enables us to frame a 
discussion of the efficiency or inefficiency of the 
NHS more carefully. In particular, it becomes clear 
that, if health maximisation is the objective, particular 
attention needs to be paid to the sorts of 
technologies that are used in health care and that, 
especially, the system needs to be designed so far 
as possible as to maximise the appropriate use of 
cost-effective technologies (in the broadest sense of 
'technologies'). 
'Macroeconomic efficiency' revisited 
What of our authors' concerns about 
'macroeconomic efficiency'? This can now be seen 
to be a question of the location of the budget line in 
quadrant III — greater resources for health care will 
push it out further from the origin and fewer 
would move it towards to origin. As it moves away 
from or towards the origin, so the health frontier 
moves away from or towards the origin in 
quadrant I, assuming that efficient technologies only 
are used. And here is the rub. In a system like the 
British one, governments will be reluctant, quite 
apart from any narrow mindedness from the 
Treasury, to expand the health care budget if the 
increases went into income increases for existing 
resource owners (such as doctors and nurses) 
rather than additional inputs, or if any real increase 
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in resources increased the use of ineffective health 
care technologies. In such cases, the budget line 
might move out but the use of inefficient production 
functions would still result in an outcome point 
beneath the health frontier in quadrant I of the 
diagram — and it may even cause the frontier to shift 
towards the origin. In these cases, additional health 
care spending yields no ultimate additional benefit 
to the clients of the system. 
Our authors note that does not seem to be much of 
a correlation between international health care 
expenditures and their measure of health status. 
There are at least three reasons why this may be 
the case: 
(i) some systems (the US notoriously) afford (some) 
workers in the health sector substantial rents in 
the sense of higher incomes than a truly 
competitive market would permit (here one 
should never lose sight of the happy symmetry 
between income and expenditure — more 
expenditure on health care always and invariably 
means an exactly corresponding increase in 
incomes for those in that sector, so calls from 
those within sectors for more expenditure may 
equally be seen as calls for more income); 
(ii) systems differ greatly in their expenditures on 
relatively ineffective (including grossly under-
utilised) technologies (again the US is notorious); 
(iii)current health status cannot anyway be 
expected to be much influenced by current 
health care expenditures, even if effective, 
partly because current health is determined 
mainly by factors other than health care, partly 
because the beneficial effects of health care 
emerge only after the passage of time, partly 
because current health status is mainly 
determined by factors occurring in the past 
rather than currently, and partly because the 
measures of health themselves are rather poor, 
being both crude and incomplete (I mean no 
criticism here — the availability of data limit 
what you can do at the macro level). 
Is the treatment appropriate? 
I do not propose to take each of the elements of 
their Prototype in turn. Space forbids that. Let us, 
however, note the general character of their 
proposals. 
(i) A Guaranteed Health Care Package 
The first striking feature is the proposal for a 
Guaranteed Health Care Package (GHCP). I do not 
have much quarrel with that but, then, there is not 
much to quarrel about since any quarrelling would 
be bound to focus on contentious issues to do with 
the contents of the package. It may be a good idea 
for the NHS to adopt a GHCP (through its 
definition would be no less contentious). 
(ii) Compulsory competitive health insurance 
The second striking feature is the proposal for 
competitive insurance coupled with a much more 
aggressive use of co-payments. The arguments for 
this seem to be advanced on efficiency grounds, 
though they are not systematically set out. Where 
in terms of the diagram are the efficiency gains 
likely to lie? One possibility would be that our 
authors expect their proposals to generate a more 
optimal overall expenditure on health care, which I 
take to mean an increase! They expect the budget 
line to move out and that this will, in turn, push 
out the health frontier. Well, since the compulsory 
two-part premium is effectively an ear-marked tax, 
it is certainly possible that this will happen. But it 
would depend, of course, on political judgements 
about acceptable premium levels and public 
subsidy, and we really need a theory of public 
choice to enable us to say how government would 
exercise its discretion. In any case, if there really are 
grounds for optimism in this respect, would it not 
be simpler to create a National Health Service 
Fund, hived off from central government, which 
would receive the earmarked income-related 
premiums of the public, and which would then 
allocate this to existing purchasers? That would 
create as much 'openness' as our authors' 
suggestions, enable the public to express their 
views on the adequacy of health care spending at 
election, and also enable a reduction in, say, income 
tax yield equal to the current expenditure on the 
NHS. 
They also expect that such a mechanism would 
enhance the productive efficiency of the system by 
weeding out inefficient technologies. I cannot 
myself see the mechanism by which this would 
happen, unless the new insurers were somehow 
more effective purchasers for the needs of their 
clients than current purchasers. But why should 
they be? In my analysis, the main reasons for 
inefficiency of this sort lie in the availability of 
information on best practice for maximum health 
gain and an environment in which purchasers have 
the ability to create incentives for providers to use 
best practice and providers the means of 
controlling (mainly) physicians so as to adopt it. 
Our authors have nothing to suggest that is 
additional to current policy or structure in this 
respect. 
Or it may be that our authors think that a 
restructured insurance function would move 
society to a more desirable point on the health 
frontier than where they think we currently are. 
Well, here it needs to be said that premiums are not 
themselves the cost of using the service and so they 
themselves will not cause much moving, though 
they may have important (and I would guess 
regressive), consequences for the sharing of the 
burden of health care finances. 
I think the Study is frankly naive about the workings 
of what the authors hope would be competitive 
insurance. Although they tell us nothing of the 
billing and monitoring mechanisms to be used, it is 
quite clear that the transactions costs of competitive 
insurance are bound to be high (I set aside the costs 
to government of monitoring and regulating the 
industry in order to maintain its competitiveness). At 
least, high in comparison to the single monopolist 
insurer in the form of the government itself or an 
agency to which the insurance function has been 
allocated (I presume through competitive tender!). 
They minimise the dangers of cream-skimming, 
which I conjecture would be substantial. It is very 
easy for a company to turn away potentially 
unattractive clients (for example by having user-
unfriendly application forms, unhelpful responses to 
telephone enquiries, discourteous front office staff). If 
I were to run such an agency I have absolutely no 
doubt that I would easily be able to erect informal 
mechanisms to cream-skim in ways impervious to 
any regulatory correction and which, at the end of 
the day, when my bottom line results raised 
eyebrows, I would be able to claim, without fear of 
authoritative contradiction, simply reflected my 
superior efficiency coupled with the free exercise of 
consumer choice. But it would all be mostly sham of 
course! At any rate, detecting my sham would 
involve a costly, and presumably public, 
bureaucracy. 
(iii) Use of co-payments 
Would the more 'rigorous' use of co-payments for 
'consumers' (including co-payments for 
components of the Guaranteed Health Care 
Package) shift the distribution of health in a way 
most of us would think desirable? Further, and 
more fundamentally, who is the consumer? One of 
the odd things about the economics of health 
systems is that nearly everyone agrees that the 
principal character who determines what resources 
shall be used, and for whom, is a doctor. This is 
only to be expected. Patients have very little 
understanding of medical technology and 
effectiveness (even less than doctors!). They are 
usually worried and anxious at the time of 
consultation, most are elderly, many are confused, 
and many are frightened. While they have the right 
to have their values and personal circumstances 
understood and respected by their doctors (this is, 
after all, one of the main reasons for having a 
system of GPs) in most cases decisions about 
resource commitment are actually taken by the 
doctor. Patients may receive care and, in that sense, 
be consumers, but they are unequal partners in the 
decision to consume. In this context it is odd to 
extrapolate from other walks of consumerist life, 
when personal judgements about what to buy are 
much less clouded by fear and anxiety, and are less 
likely to be delegated in whole or part to a 
professional agent (who may have his or her own 
personal agenda to pursue which may conflict with 
the patient's) and, via this extrapolation, suggest 
that financial brakes (note we are now trying to 
reduce expenditures, not increase them) be applied 
to the patient. Why not the doctor? What are the 
grounds for supposing that the greater use of 
patient out-of-pocket payments would enhance the 
efficiency of the system? None are presented and I 
cannot imagine what they might be. Isn't it all a bit 
like blaming the overcrowding in prisons on the 
absence of co-payments for their use? The analogy 
may not be perfect — after all, people are not sent to 
prison in the same way of for the same reason as 
they are sent to hospital. But it is apt in the sense 
that the decision is largely taken by another party. 
Would it not, therefore, be more sensible to charge 
the doctor? After all, he or she is the real decision 
taker and he or she is in a much better position to 
form a judgement about the legitimate claims of 
one patient relative to another on the inevitably 
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limited resources available to maximise the 
community's health. But, then, is not that what we 
more or less have with fundholding (GPs with 
budgets to purchase health care at prices set by 
other providers) and increasingly in the internal 
budgeting systems in use in hospitals? If it ain't 
broke, why fix it? I am sure that our authors do not 
intend this but there is an unmistakable whiff of 
victim blaming in these proposals. The patient is a 
victim of ill-fortune or self-induced calamity, so 
let's saddle him or her with further burdens, even 
though there is no perceptible reason for supposing 
that these burdens will, even in subtle indirect 
32 	 ways, lead to substantive improvements in either 
welfare or health. I do not object to modest 
charges, mainly as fund raisers. But 'rigorous' 
charges? There is disturbing evidence, especially 
from the USA, that even minor user-charges subject 
to a modest annual maximum annual outlay per 
insured person, deter — and deter particularly 
utilisation by children and the poor. If we are to 
deter people from early consultation with GPs, 
which is the stage at which preliminary (and 
sometimes final) judgements about the need for 
medical care are made, then there is the grave risk 
of introducing what would actually be a feature 
that would substantially impede the system's 
ability to deliver health gain — for it would become 
increasingly difficult to identify the existence of the 
very needs the system is there to meet, let alone set 
about meeting them. But, then, our authors do 
seem to have it in mind to have extensive 
exemptions from copayments, even in a 'rigorous' 
system. But how would that differ from what we 
now have? Whose consumption are they trying to 
deter? How rigorous is 'rigorous'? And whose 
bureaucracy would manage a system with 
exemptions? 
A part of the Study's case for co-payments is `to 
make patients more aware of the cost of treatment' 
(p 1133). I find this argument at best incomplete. It 
is incomplete partly in that it is not clear what 
would follow in the way of behaviour from such 
awareness, apart from a normal responsiveness 
arising out of any elasticity in demand, which is 
likely, as I have argued, to impair the cost-effective 
maximisation of health gain. It is incomplete 
further in that paying only part of the cost at the 
point of use is in fact to receive a false signal about 
(marginal?) cost. We already know that much of 
the British electorate thinks that it has 'paid its 
share' of the public expenditure on health care via 
National Insurance. If anything, then, the message 
received by patients would be that the care they 
receive cost much less than it actually does. This 
proposal does not, then, produce the transparency 
claimed for it. 
(iv) Enforceable contracts 
The authors' advocacy of enforceability seems 
much too bold in our current state of knowledge. It 
is not clear what the relationship between 
purchasers and providers is in terms of contractual 
obligations, statutory obligations, and obligations 
arising out of tort and restitution. Additionally, 
effective contract enforcement is crucially 
dependent upon information being available that 
will stand the test in determining whether or not 
obligations have been carried out. Such 
information concerns, among other things, 
information about service mix, quality, and risk. A 
further complication is that the status of patients in 
the contracting process is problematic. The 
traditional contract doctrines of privity and 
consideration preclude third parties like patients 
from enforcing contracts even when such contracts 
are made to further their interests. Even when all 
these issues have been resolved there would 
remain the question of the behavioural and 
economic implications of them. 
It therefore seems clear that much more experience 
and research is needed here and I frankly doubt 
whether the general conclusion to which we might 
eventually come would be to make all contracts 
legally binding. The current arrangement is that 
contracts between purchasers and providers are not 
legally enforceable as contracts but are subject to 
arbitration by the Secretary of State. This is itself a 
murky legal area and suggests, along with all the 
other considerations, that there is much to be yet 
thought about concerning the legal status of 
contracts. 
(v) Insurance, moral hazard, externalities and 
agency 
There is a good deal more that might have to be 
said once the proposals were got up in greater 
detail. For example, would premiums be set for 
individuals or families and whose income would 
count in the income-related bit of the premium, 
whose health experience in the health-related part 
of the premium? Are these matters which could be 
left to the market to sort out? If the government 
chose to have a health policy, as seems reasonable 
to suppose it might, what would be the 
mechanisms by which such a policy might be 
implemented? How would the vexed interface 
between the health services, conventionally 
defined, and local authority services be managed 
under the proposed reforms? We have recently 
seen a major switch in the location of care away 
from institutions to the community — 'there's no 
place like home' (even if it's in a cardboard box 
under a railway arch). How would such policies be 
developed and managed under the new system? 
All systems of health insurance have their own 
ways of resolving moral hazard problems of 
various kinds — those that arise ex post at the 
consumption end when insured parties have an 
incentive to demand more when the user-price falls 
as a result of insurance, those that arise (also ex 
post) when providers see opportunities for billing 
practices that inflate the true costs of effective care, 
and those that arise ex ante when insured parties 
face a reduced incentive to avoid the circumstance 
that may lead to their making a claim on the 
insurer. 
There is an undoubted potential inefficiency 
inherent in moral hazard — 'potential' because 
although moral hazard tends to increase 
consumption, whether it does so beyond optimal 
rates depends on the extent of externalities that 
lead the social optimum rate to be one higher than 
the individually selected rate. Although the 
authors refer to this phenomenon (p 144), they 
claim that there are few such effects other than that 
of communicable disease. This sort of eternality has 
been largely internalised by the NHS and public 
health measures in the UK, as have the utility 
interdependencies to which they merely refer in a 
footnote on the next page. However, the fact (as I 
conjecture it to be) that these have been largely 
internalised does not, of course, mean that they 
cannot be 'uninternalised' if the system were to be 
changed. These effects are thus a potential (and 
potent) source of inefficiency. The standard market 
response to moral hazard (of the consumer's ex post 
kind) is co-payment but we have already seen that 
there are grounds for doubting the relevance of this 
mechanism in a system aiming to maximise health. 
What would be the future role of GPs in the 
reformed system — still gatekeepers, still the 
coordinators of community and institutional care, 
still those professionals chiefly charged with the 
task of knowing a good deal about the 'whole 
patient' and able to make clinical (and other) 
judgements in the context of as a complete an 
'agency relationship' as probably exists anywhere 
in the world? Would they still be those who 
purchase from the secondary sector for their 
patients? Or will the new system require the 
patient to make an initial diagnosis to decide 
whom to consult (pain in the shoulder therefore I 
shall go to a physiotherapist), give him or her 
direct access to outpatient clinics in hospital, and 
require him or her to make their own arrangements 
for after care, community services, and all the rest? 
And what of the government's own insurance fund 
— the NHF? (p 1130), which is supposed to operate 
on a level playing field with the private insurers, 
and without public subsidy, but which seems likely 
to wind up with a highly unbalanced portfolio of 
risk, if only because the poorest will be the sickest? 
I do not ask these as rhetorical questions but as 
ones that need addressing before a full evaluation 
of the proposals can be made. And they need 
addressing because they are important matters that 
have the potential for major disturbance both to the 
efficiency and the equity of health care in the UK. 
Nor do I ask them in the fond belief that the NHS 
as it is, and as it is now evolving, has found the 
perfect answers. I ask them because the onus is on 
those who propose change to be clear about what's 
wrong, how significantly wrong it may be, what's 
needed to put it right, and how much 
improvement it may be reasonable to expect as a 
result. Reformers do not have to promise the earth, 
but we do need to know the approximate shades of 
green of the grass on the other side. And the 
burden of reasonable proof lies with them. 
(vi) Patient choice 
Another principal objective of the NHS since the 
recent reforms has been to widen patient choice. 
Here we confront a large number of difficult issues, 
most of which have to do with the 'doctor-patient 
relationship' and the 'agency role' of doctors. In its 
idealised form, this relationship consists of two 
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individuals coming together to determine a course 
of action. The doctor is supposed to bring to this 
relationship an expertise in the probable 
consequences of alternative courses of medical 
action and a skilled judgement as to what 
procedures are likely to be effective. The patient 
brings personal circumstances, values and 
preferences, perhaps occasionally some medical 
knowledge, and is frequently confused, frightened 
and having difficulty articulating his or her 
perceptions, even to a GP with whom they may be 
very familiar. The art lies either in the patient 
transmitting the relevant personal circumstance 
34. 	 and values for the doctor to fit them into his or her 
portfolio of medical knowledge so as to make a 
recommendation, or in the doctor transmitting the 
medical knowledge for the patient to fit into his or 
her portfolio of personal knowledge so as to make 
a decision. 
Several things are required if this relationship is to 
work well: 
• the first thing is that the doctor be thoroughly 
competent in his or her expertise; 
• the second is that the relationship be such as to 
encourage trust on both sides; 
• a third is that the resource and reward 
environment in which the doctor operates 
should not cause his/her advice to be 
compromised by factors that are not a legitimate 
part of the relationship while, on the other 
hand, enabling him/her to form a judgement 
about the priority that claims on resources by 
other patients of their own (they are not 
typically in a good position to judge the claims 
made by patients on other doctors relative to 
those made by their patients on themselves) and 
which can often involve the tactful denial of 
care of some types to some patients whose need 
is judged to be of very low priority); 
• a fourth is that the willingness of the patient to 
come forward to have questions answered, 
anxieties allayed and needs assessed should not 
be prejudiced by irrelevancies such as co-
payments; 
• a fifth, on which I want momentarily to focus, 
is that the balance between the weights given to 
the doctor's and the patient's judgements must 
vary according to circumstances. 
There are some cases where the doctor's 
judgements are extremely marginal, for example, 
shall the patient have a private room in hospital 
with bedside office facilities? In such a case, and 
assuming that having or not having these facilities 
really is irrelevant for the medical outcome, there is 
every reason to permit free choice, out of pocket 
payment, and private supplementary insurance, 
there being no obvious threat to either health or 
equity from the exercise of such choice. Such 
possibilities are clearly implementable within the 
current public and private arrangements. In other 
cases, the decision must be balanced between the 
two. For example, in many situations when the 
question arises as to whether a woman shall have a 
caesarean section, and especially in difficult 
decisions where there is a relatively low risk of a 
good outcome from a particular treatment and 
quite a high risk of a bad outcome — the doctor 
may be quite good at judging the risk but the 
patient is more expert in judging the acceptability of 
the risk. Another case requiring balance is where 
there are difficult trade-offs, for example in the case 
of cancer of the larynx, where surgery may prolong 
life briefly but at the cost of the loss of voice and 
medical management may involve a shorter life 
expectation but use of the voice for longer. 
At the other extreme are choices where the patient 
is in no position at all to contribute to the decision, 
as when he/she is unconscious and an immediate 
decision is required (though relatives may be 
legitimately involved in lieu). Some limitations of 
choice may be more damaging to patient freedom 
and autonomy than others. It is a characteristic of 
some systems (for example, Preferred Provider 
Organisations in the US) that there is a limited 
choice of hospital doctors from whom to choose. 
This undoubtedly reduces the range of choice but, 
if there are good other grounds for limiting choice 
in this way, the loss may be judged acceptable 
provided that the controlling doctor (say, the GP) 
has confidence in those secondary doctors to whom 
referrals may be made and the patient too has a 
similar confidence in the GP's judgement. Systems 
which (or doctors who), however, deny patients the 
opportunity to have their values properly taken 
into account are unacceptable. Systems which 
arbitrarily deny choice (even when there is a 
willingness to pay) over the quite considerable 
range of 'hotel' type services which necessarily 
accompany much medical care, are likewise 
unacceptable. The NHS plainly has a long way to 
go in developing the latter freedoms of choice. But 
creating these opportunities requires no great 
radical reform. 
Which are the choices which our authors wish to 
see expanded and why are their proposals needed 
in order to bring this expansion about? Again, 
these are not rhetorical questions. They need 
answering before one can enter in to a useful 
dialogue on the meaning of patient choice, those 
elements to which greatest importance is attached, 
the principal deficiencies of the NHS that need 
putting right, and the various means at our 
disposal for putting them right. I miss such a 
discussion in the Report. Indeed it seems quite 
likely that the introduction of competitive 
insurance (and fee-for-service physician 
remuneration?) could all too easy militate against 
the ideal relationship, as I have described it, for 
example, by directly encouraging the use of 
treatments that are to the doctor's but not the 
patient's advantage, or indirectly by encouraging 
the hospital sector to invest in 'me-too' 
technologies that involve hospital doctors 
operating too low on their learning curves for 
effective (let alone cost-effective) care. 
The short term proposals 
The short term recommendations (p 1124-6) are (I 
omit any that are the same as long term ones): 
• increase the rate of introduction of capitated GP 
and Health Authority purchasers; 
• increase overall funding; 
• introduce an earmarked tax called health 
premiums and reduce other tax equivalently; 
• depend less on block contracts and use 
prospective cost per patient instead; 
• increase the use of co-payments to include 
primary, secondary and tertiary care (with 
appropriate exemptions. 
I tend to support the first three of these and reject, 
for reasons already rehearsed, the last one. I am not 
sure what to make of the authors' contracting 
proposals. On the one hand they want to stop 
block contracting; on the other they want greater 
flexibility. No discussion of optimal contracting can 
ignore the transactions and enforcement costs that 
are entailed. It is odd that block contracts, which 
may be optimal at least for some packages of care, 
are to be outlawed. In general I incline to an 
evolutionary approach: not knowing a priori what 
is right one must rely on experience. 
I ought, however, to say in relation to the first 
recommendation that there is a major tension in the 
present system between purchasing Health 
Authorities and purchasing GPs. The former are 
charged with identifying the needs of their 
catchment communities (which I regard as the 
single most important feature of the recent reforms) 
and arranging for it to be met; the latter deal with 
the needs of their own patient group within the 
larger group. It is plain that coordination and 
consistency are required and that the ability of 
Authorities to discharge their duties was being 
increasingly prejudiced as their income was 
topsliced to fund GPs. It would have been 
interesting to have read an analysis of this issue in 
the Study and what role they see in the future for 
Family Health Service Authorities, whose merger 
with DHAs is the current policy response to this 
problem. 
Although the Prototype seems to envisage the 
removal of purchasing District Health Authorities, 
the specific short term proposals for the UK allow 
for their retention, with 'consumer' choice of 
Authority. It seems, then, that we are to envisage 
three sorts of purchaser: GPs, Health Authorities 
and competitive insurers. This seems to be a recipe 
for chaos, especially if the HAs were also 
competing for clients' custom. How, for example, 
would differences be reconciled if, as seems likely, 
GPs and competitive insurers felt obliged by 
market pressures to purchase services judged 
ineffective by Authorities, or that did not address 
the major needs identified by Authorities? And 
what sort of information base is to be supplied 
(and by whom) to inform better the purchasing 
choices of GPs and competitive insurers, granted 
the already inadequate base that exists for 
purchasing Authorities, the very wide variability of 
GP competence in epidemiological understanding, 
and the general ignorance of the public for whose 
custom these various agents will be competing? 
There is something of a curiosum in the proposals 
to which I have not referred so far: that there 
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should be price ceilings on some forms of 
treatment, such as geriatric care (p 1133). This 
seems odd, in part because geriatric services (or at 
least the health care services used by the elderly) 
are such a large part of total expenditures and the 
proposal seems almost an after-thought, and in 
part because it is so out of line with the market 
orientation of the rest of the Study. What shall 
these ceilings be, who shall set them, and who 
monitor and enforce them? What, anyway, is their 
justification in terms of the economic efficiency that 
underlies the whole Study? 
Final comments and 
conclusions 
I have focussed my comments mainly on the 'long 
term' treatment recommended for the patient by 
the authors rather than the intermediate treatment 
they recommend. The reason for this is plain —
should the long term treatment be deemed not 
appropriate or cost-effective, then we need not 
enquire too diligently into the intermediate 
treatments. Moreover, the short and medium term 
proposals are in large part contained within the 
long term ones, so any discussion of the latter will 
have embraced a good deal of the former. I must 
say, however, that I have grave reservation both 
about the diagnosis and the recommended 
treatment. My analysis has not been made the 
easier for the absence of a clearly defined set of 
objectives. I have tried to be rather clearer and 
specific in my own reactions. My own view is that 
the patient's condition is not such as to warrant the 
draconian measures proposed and that even if it 
were in a parlous state, I am not convinced of the 
efficacy or cost-effectiveness of the treatments 
recommended. Nor am I convinced that the 
objectives sought, once they were made clear, are 
those to which most of us would want to subscribe. 
There are also many gaps in the analysis. Changes 
as radical as those proposed for the UK generate a 
host of important questions — to some of which I 
have alluded — and which would require a good 
deal of careful thought and investigation if the 
dangers inherent in them were not to swamp 
potential benefits from such changes, if there are 
any to be had. Issues such as the definition of 
'need', how best to promote effective medical care, 
the transaction costs of competitive insurance, the 
sorts of patient choice that need expanding, 
adverse selection, moral hazard, cream skimming, 
externalities, equitable distribution of benefits, 
enforceability of contracts, and so on, are complex 
and best discussed in the context of concrete 
proposals and an awareness of the nature of the 
problems that can arise. 
Nor, I fear, ought anyone to take the limited 
forecasting exercise presented in the Study (p 73-
80) too seriously. A good idea of the predictive 
power of estimating equations can be given if a 
subset of the data are used to estimate the 
equation, whose predictions for other years in the 
data set can be compared with the actuals for those 
years. It is not entirely clear what our authors did 
from the Report, for the estimation period of the 
'supply equation' is stated (under the equation) to 
be 1960-1986, but the text refers to an estimation 
over the period 1960-1990. There is a comment that 
the equation for the shorter period does not explain 
the period 1986-1990 well, and this is not 
surprising since these equations have been shown 
to be unstable elsewhere. Their estimated income 
elasticities are higher than most of those found in 
the literature, which gives grounds for caution. 
There has been a considerable discussion of these 
procedures in issues of journal of Health Economics, 
which is not referred to, where methodology and 
the literature are discussed in greater detail. 
Moreover, the projections of 'need' are based not on 
UK data but on those for other countries, on the basis 
of which it is said (p 78) that UK current need is for 
9 per cent of GDP to be spent on health care rather 
than the current 6.1 per cent (1990). I have 
commented earlier on the weakness of this kind of 
comparison but to use other countries' estimates of 
need as a proxy for the UK's seems extraordinary. 
Taken together, these considerations suggest that 
the somewhat alarmist warning (p 80) about an 
increasing and unsustainable shortfall between 
need and supply ought not to be taken too 
seriously. If there is a shortfall it needs to be 
identified and detailed in other ways — ways which 
have a closer relationship to the economic concept 
of efficiency and the ethical concept of equity. 
My own view, to put it rather generally, is that 
current policy towards the NHS is, in broad terms, 
right in terms of structure — what I have called 
'demand-side socialism', which is, of course, quite 
consistent with private ownership (and for-profit 
motivation) on the supply side, provided that 
providers act at the behest of purchasing 
Authorities and GPs. I think the objective of 
maximising health gain is appropriate and that the 
separation of provider and purchaser has had, and 
is having, a useful effect in forcing attention 
(especially purchasers' attention) on issues of 
effectiveness and need and is galvanising the 
research and development community into the 
provision of a demand-led set of methodologies 
and results that, over time, stands a good chance of 
revolutionising the overall efficiency of the system. 
I am less persuaded that competition between 
providers is likely to yield efficiency gains of 
significance apart from the sort of relocation of 
activity from high-rent sites to low-rent sites that is 
currently raising difficult questions of 'exit' for 
policy makers. I also take the view, however, that 
the many distributional issues in health and health 
care (both on the financing side and the delivery 
side) need much greater thought, discussion and 
research, particularly at the policy-making centre 
and at the level of the purchaser. 
I do not think that the case for radical change in 
financing methods has been made, though I do feel 
sympathy for the idea of hiving off the compulsory 
public insurance function. An independent 
National Health Fund funded out of earmarked 
contributions proportionate to average income tax 
rates has attractions, particularly if it could be so 
designed as to cause it to fall outside public 
expenditure. I, however, would not see this as a 
residual sort of fund of the kind of envisaged by 
the authors. There must be some way of operating 
a compulsory insurance system, monitored and 
regulated by central government, that was not a 
part of the tax system (even if the Inland Revenue 
was the agency via which — for a fee — the 
contributions of taxpayers were collected and 
delivered to the Fund). This would not completely 
insulate health care expenditures from the probably 
arbitrary limits imposed by macro economic 
judgements, and it would evidently fall to 
government to determine or control the premiums 
charged, but it would — or it could — create that 
magic transformation through which 
('unproductive') public spending was turned into 
('productive') private spending, and 'non-wealth-
creating' production was transformed into 'wealth-
creating' production. This is, of course, merely to 
swap myths. Unfortunately, myths are hard to get 
rid of but they do have consequences, some of 
which are bad and some good. Replacing a myth 
with bad consequences with one that had good 
consequences would be no bad thing and the main 
good consequence would be to give the public an 
opportunity more directly to determine the total 
spend on health care. 
I am therefore much more modest in my own 
proposals for reform. I prefer the UK Cochrane 
Centre to competitive insurance as a means of 
securing greater efficiency, public purchasing 
health authorities to private health insurers as a 
means of revealing need, and GP gatekeepers to co-
payment-determined independent access to the 
entire system as a means of investigating prima facie 
need and coordinating the work of providers for 
individual patients. I think health care is probably 
under-financed in the UK and would welcome a 
new mechanism to correct this provided that 
increased financing was translated into increased 
cost-effective resource use and not rent-seeking and 
waste. In short, I think what we have in Britain is a 
nut of a problem and our authors are offering us a 
sledgehammer which not only smashes the nut to 
smithereens but may also break our toes, or backs, 
or both. It also seems altogether premature to 
jettison the current structures when they have 
hardly yet had time to deliver on their promise. 
The prospect of subjecting the NHS to yet another 
upheaval is too awful to contemplate, even thought 
the evidence is that managers would respond as 
energetically as they have to Working for Patients 
and all its sequelae. (In passing, one might note that 
the alleged resistance of the NHS 'bureaucracy' to 
change is quite unsustainable. One can only marvel 
at the way in which NHS management has 
responded to the recent challenges of managing 
change). 
Let me end with some wise words from C E 
Lindblom: 'A market is like a tool: designed to do 
certain jobs but unsuited for others. Not wholly 
familiar with what it can do, people often leave it 
lying in the drawer when they could use it. But 
then, they also use it when they should not, like an 
amateur craftsman who carelessly uses his chisel 
as a screwdriver.' 
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